A Shakeup for the Duty of Confidentiality: The Competing Priorities of a California Government Attorney by Shpall, Jessica
Page 1 of 1 
A Shakeup for the Duty of Confidentiality: The Competing 
Priorities of a California Government Attorney  
I. Introduction 
In the early hours of January 17, 1994, a 6.7 magnitude 
earthquake struck the Los Angeles area, killing seventy-two 
people and injuring 1,500.1  Ninety-two percent of the structural 
damage affected apartment buildings.2  The Northridge quake was 
the most expensive disaster California had endured, causing $27 
billion of building damage.3  In its aftermath, victims filed 
more than 600,000 insurance claims.4  After having paid for 
earthquake insurance year after year, many of these 
policyholders were severely shortchanged when insurance 
companies mishandled their cases and denied them coverage.5 
                                                
1 Roberta Ann Johnson, Whistleblowing: When it Works and Why 40 
(2003).  
2 Id.  
3 Lorena Iñiguez, The Quackenbush Years, L.A. Times, June 29, 
2000, at A24.   
4Johnson, supra note 1, at 41. 
5Cindy Ossias, Whistleblower’s Tale, The Sacramento Bee, July 23, 
2003, at I1.    
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Consistent with its mission of “protect[ing] the consumers' 
insurance interests,”6 the California Department of Insurance 
(“CDI”) investigated how several insurance companies adjudicated 
these claims and concluded that the companies had not complied 
with insurance regulations.7  However, instead of fining the 
companies and forcing them to pay restitution to the wronged 
earthquake victims, the Insurance Commissioner, Charles 
Quackenbush, settled with the companies by allowing them to make 
nominal, tax-exempt “donations” to non-profit organizations.8      
Then a CDI employee named Cindy Ossias blew the whistle, 
exposing the truth about Quackenbush’s donation scheme.9  When 
the California Assembly Insurance Committee asked Ossias about 
the dubious settlements, she handed over internal CDI 
                                                
6 About Us: An Introduction to CDI Operations, 
http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0500-about-us/0100-cdi-introduction/ 
(last visited January 3, 2008). 
7Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Discipline, State Bar of 
Cal., Report and Recommendation on AB 363 4 (2001), available at 
http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/3cp0107c.pdf [hereinafter 
COPRAC Report].      
8 Ossias, supra note 5.   
9Id.                          
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documents.10  Partially as a result of her actions, testimony 
before lawmakers revealed that the Insurance Commissioner had 
failed to sufficiently discipline the insurance companies and, 
worse yet, that he had used the funds for personal gain.11  
Quackenbush eventually resigned.12               
If the whistleblower had been a CDI economist, secretary, 
or case worker, she would have quietly returned to work because 
California’s whistleblower statutes protect employees from 
retaliation.13  However, because Ossias was a CDI attorney, she 
was far from off the hook.  The State Bar began to investigate 
whether she should be disciplined for violating the duty of 
confidentiality by revealing the documents to the Legislature.14  
By favoring her duty to serve the public over whatever duty of 
                                                
10Id. 
11Iñiguez, supra note 3.   
12 Virginia Ellis, State Insurance Dept. Reinstates Whistle-
blower, L.A. Times, Aug. 13, 2000, at A33 [hereinafter Ellis, 
Insurance Dept. Reinstates Whistle-blower]. 
13See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 8547.8, 53298 (West 2007).  
14Richard A. Zitrin & Carol M. Langford, Legal Ethics in the 
Practice of Law 550 (2d ed. 2001).  
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confidentiality she may have owed to her “client,”15 Ossias 
almost lost her ability to practice law.16      
Government attorneys17 in California are caught between 
competing policies.  On one hand, as government employees, they 
are encouraged by the whistleblower protection statutes to 
report misconduct in their departments.18  On the other, as 
attorneys, they have sworn to maintain their clients’ 
confidentiality.19  This tension forces a government attorney who 
has witnessed wrongdoing to choose between her desire to serve 
the public and her ethical obligations as a lawyer.   
                                                
15See infra, Section IV(C).  The question of to whom a government 
attorney owes the duty of confidentiality is far from clear in 
California.  Depending on how one defines the government 
“client,” it is very possible that Ossias did not violate her 
duty of confidentiality.   
16 Telephone Interview with Cindy Ossias, Senior Staff Counsel, 
Cal. Dep’t of Ins. (September 24, 2007). 
17The term “government attorney” may include both attorneys who 
work full-time as public servants and private counsel retained 
by the government.  COPRAC REPORT, supra note 7 at 11 n.30.   
18 See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 8547.8, 53298 (West 2007). 
19Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e) (West 2007).  
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After the Ossias affair, both the California Legislature 
and the State Bar recognized the need to clarify when and how a 
potential government attorney could safely blow the whistle 
without risking her ability to practice law; however, after 
several attempts, no new rules or laws have been passed.20  The 
way in which Ossias’ case was handled was particular to her 
situation; the State Bar prosecutor made it clear that his 
decision to drop Ossias’ case was not precedential.21  As a 
result, a government attorney contemplating whether to blow the 
whistle in the future would face the same uncertainty as Ossias 
but might instead decline to disclose wrongdoing to the 
detriment of the public interest.  Who knows how many other 
government attorneys have chosen to remain silent to the 
detriment of the public good?   
Section II will discuss the factual background of the 
Ossias case.  Section III will explore the current legal 
framework governing whistleblower protections and the duty of 
confidentiality.  Section IV will consider how this framework 
fails to meet the ethical concerns of government attorneys.  
                                                
20See infra, Section II(B).  
21Letter from Donald R. Steedman to Richard Alan Zitrin (Oct. 11, 
2000), in Zitrin & Langford, supra note , at 551 [hereinafter 
Steedman Letter]. 
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Section V will propose solutions that reconcile these problems 
without compromising the traditional division of labor between 
the Legislature and the judiciary.   
II. Factual Background 
A.  The Ground Shakes at the Department of Insurance 
After the Northridge earthquake, the California Department 
of Insurance (“CDI”) investigated how several insurance 
companies adjudicated claims, concluding that the claim 
practices were not in compliance with insurance regulations.22  
CDI attorneys and examiners compiled grievances against the 
insurance companies into confidential internal reports called 
market conduct examinations.23       
 CDI attorney Cindy Ossias had participated in preparing the 
market conduct examinations.24  She and other staff members found 
that the insurance companies had mistreated policyholders by 
conducting cursory damage inspections, making insufficient 
settlement offers to pay for repairs, unreasonably delaying 
damage discovery and payments, and then denying supplemental 
claims based on an alleged expiration of the statute of 
                                                
22COPRAC Report, supra note 7.  
23Telephone Interview with Cindy Ossias, supra note 16. 
24Id. 
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limitations.25  As a result, the market conduct examinations 
recommended that the companies pay millions of dollars in 
fines.26 
Instead of forcing the companies to make restitution for 
their behavior, Insurance Commissioner Charles Quackenbush 
settled with the insurance companies.27  Quackenbush agreed not 
to impose fines or finalize the market condition examinations if 
the insurers would make donations to organizations dedicated to 
earthquake education.28  These donations totaled $12 million and 
were tax-deductible.29 
                                                
25Cindy Ossias, Whistleblower’s Tale, The Sacramento Bee, July 
23, 2003, at I1.  
26Iñiguez, supra note 3.  Ossias testified before the Assembly 
Insurance Committee that she had expected fines to range from 
$20-40 million.  COPRAC Report, supra note 7, at 4. 
27 Virginia Ellis & Carl Ingram, Whistleblower Emerges in 
Quackenbush Probe, L.A. Times, June 23, 2000, at A21.  
28Id. 
29Iñiguez, supra note 3.  Quackenbush’s California Research and 
Assistance Fund received 12.8 million in tax exempt “voluntary 
contributions” from insurance companies.  Id.  Firemen’s Fund 
paid $550,000.00 to a special fund to avoid further 
investigation, Allstate paid $2 million to the California 
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When Ossias and her colleagues noticed the large 
discrepancy between the penalties they had recommended and the 
tax-deductible donations represented in the settlement 
agreements, they were “appalled.”30  Both the Los Angeles Times 
and the California Legislature noticed this irregularity and 
began investigating Quackenbush’s actions.31  In January, 2000, 
when a consultant to the California Assembly Insurance Committee 
Chairman asked Ossias whether she knew anything about the 
settlements, she “put him off at first, grappled with [her] 
conscience and then offered him the [market conduct examination] 
reports.”32  Once Ossias turned over the reports to the 
Legislature, the Senate judiciary subcommittee revealed them to 
the public by posting them on the Internet.33  During a 
                                                                                                                                                       
Research and Assistance Fund, and 20th Century Insurance and 
state Farm also donated to special foundations.  Id.      
30Ossias, supra note 5; see also Zitrin & Langford, supra note 
14.  
31Id.  
32Ossias, supra note 5.  The Legislature began to focus on 
Quackenbush as a result of a Los Angeles Times investigation 
into the foundations.  Zitrin & Langford, supra note 14.    
33Ellis & Ingram, supra note 27. 
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department-wide investigation that Quackenbush initiated,34 
Ossias admitted during an “interview/interrogation” that she was 
the whistleblower.35  The next day, the department Chief Counsel 
ordered her to “vacate the premises immediately” and take 
administrative leave.36  
Once the Assembly Insurance Committee and the California 
Attorney General began to investigate the matter, information 
about the foundations’ involvement with Quackenbush’s political 
and personal interests began to surface.37  The straw that broke 
the camel’s back was testimony that the “commissioner personally 
ordered his staff to collect $4 million in settlements with 
title insurance companies for TV commercials featuring 
                                                
34Ellis, Insurance Dept. Reinstates Whistle-blower, supra note 
12. 
35Ossias, supra note 5. 
36Id.   
37Iñiguez, supra note 3.  Instead of addressing earthquake-
related issues, the foundations sponsored a poll about 
Commissioner Quackenbush’s political reputation and funded a 
football training program that two of Quackenbush’s children 
attended.  Id.   
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Quackenbush.”38  Two days later, Quackenbush announced his 
resignation.39   
Ossias was eventually reinstated by Quackenbush’s successor 
in August, 200040 and continues to work there today.41 Ossias was 
not fired as a result of her actions because California 
whistleblower laws protect government employees from 
retaliation.42  However, Ossias’ status as an attorney was 
threatened when the State Bar’s Office of Trial Counsel began 
investigating whether her disclosure of confidential material43 
merited disciplinary measures.44  Eventually, the State Bar 
discontinued the investigation without determining whether 
                                                
38Id.  Ossias also testified that “she and other insurance 
department lawyers had been ordered to shred documents 
containing their recommendations for fines against the 
companies.”  Ellis, Insurance Dept. Reinstates Whistle-blower, 
supra note 12. 
39Id. 
40Id. 
41See Telephone Interview with Cindy Ossias, supra note 16. 
42See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 8547.8, 53298 (West 2007).  
43 The duty of confidentiality is codified in Cal. Bus. & Prof. 
Code § 6068(e) (West 2007).   
44See Zitrin & Langford, supra note 14. 
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Ossias had acted ethically.45  In a letter to Ossias’ attorney,46 
the Bar prosecutor never identified whom was Ossias’ client and 
whether she had breached the duty of confidentiality.47   
Ossias was forced to choose between her desire as a public 
employee to report government wrongdoing and her binding ethical 
duty as an attorney to maintain client confidentiality.  Because 
attorney conduct is governed both by statute48 and Rules of 
Professional Conduct promulgated by the California Supreme Court 
and California State Bar,49 both the Legislature and Bar 
considered ways clarify the relationship of government 
transparency policy and the duty of confidentiality.50   
B.  The Legislature and State Bar Try to Pick Up the Pieces 
Soon after the Ossias case, Assemblyman Darrel Steinberg 
(D-Sacramento) proposed Assembly Bill (“A.B.”) 363, which would 
create an exception to the duty of confidentiality enumerated in 
                                                
45Id. 
46Steedman Letter, supra note 21.  
47Zitrin & Langford, supra note 14.  Instead, the State Bar 
prosecutors “exonerated Ossias on whistleblowing and public 
policy grounds.”  Id.; see infra, Section IV(2).    
48Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6000-6238 (West 2007).  
49Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R 1-100(A) (2007).  
50See COPRAC Report, supra note 7, at 2.  
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section 6068(e) of the California Business and Professions 
Code.51  The exception was drafted to protect government lawyers 
in California from the threat of losing their bar licenses when 
they revealed confidential information to expose wrongdoing.52  
While the Assembly was considering A.B. 363, Assemblyman 
Steinberg requested that the Attorney General’s office comment 
on whether “’whistleblower’ statutory protections applicable to 
employees of the state and local public entities supersede the 
statutes and rules governing the attorney-client privilege[.]”53  
                                                
51Virginia Ellis, Bill Proposes Protections for State Lawyers, 
L.A. Times, Feb 22, 2001 at 3 [hereinafter Ellis, Bill Proposes 
Protections]; see Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e) (West 2000).   
52Ellis, Bill Proposes Protections, supra note 51. 
5384 Op. Cal. Att’y Gen. 71, 74 (2001) [hereinafter Attorney 
General].  Although both the Steinberg query and the Attorney 
General’s opinion seem to use the terms “attorney-client 
privilege” and “duty of confidentiality” interchangeably, the 
net result of the Attorney General’s conclusion is that the 
whistleblower laws do not automatically override statutes that 
deal with attorney conduct.  See Charles S. Doskow, The 
Government Attorney and the Right to Blow the Whistle: The Cindy 
Ossias Case and Its Aftermath (A Two-Year Journey to Nowhere), 
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The opinion concluded that the Legislature did not intend the 
whistleblower statutes to supersede the ethics provisions 
governing attorney-client privilege.54 
The Assembly passed A.B. 363 and the Senate Judiciary 
Committee took it under submission.55  Soon, the State Bar became 
interested in the possibility of amending the Rules of 
Professional Conduct instead of the Business and Professions 
Code.56  On July 9, 2001, the Senate suspended its hearings and 
permitted the State Bar to conduct its own study of how A.B. 363 
might impact government lawyers.57 
The State Bar’s Committee on Professional Responsibility 
and Discipline of (“COPRAC”) determined that, instead of a 
statutory exception, it would be more effective for the Supreme 
Court amend Rule 3-600 to specifically address the needs of 
                                                                                                                                                       
25 Whittier L. Rev. at 38-39 (2003) [hereinafter Doskow, Two-
Year Journey to Nowhere].   
54Attorney General, supra note 53; Doskow, Two-Year Journey to 
Nowhere, supra note 53, at 38.  “The opinion frames the issue as 
one of precedence and legislative intent.”  Id. 
55COPRAC Report, supra note 7, at 2 n.4.  
56 COPRAC Report, supra note 7, at 2.  
57Id.  
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government attorneys.58  The State Bar Board of Governors adopted 
the change and sent it to the Supreme Court for approval.59  The 
Supreme Court, in a terse opinion, denied the request on the 
grounds that “the proposed modifications conflict with Business 
and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision(e).”60 
After the Supreme Court denied the request to modify the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, the Legislature resumed its 
                                                
58Id. at 3.  Rule 3-600 identifies the “client” of an attorney 
representing an organization and a reporting scheme in the case 
of internal wrongdoing.  Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3-600 
(2007).  COPRAC noted that the current focus of Rule 3-600 is 
limited to attorneys who represent private organizations.  Id.  
Amending rule 3-600 to address the needs of government attorneys 
was the preferred approach because the AB 363 would “permit 
government attorneys to make disclosure to anyone based on the 
attorney’s unilateral judgment that a government official has 
engaged in misconduct.”  Id.  For an in-depth study of Rule 3-
600 and the proposed changes, see infra, Sections IV(C), V(B).   
59Doskow, Two-Year Journey to Nowhere, supra note 54, at 42-43. 
60In Re Adoption of Amendments to Rule 3-600 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, No. S106482 (Cal. 2002) (on file with the 
State Bar of California); see also Don J. DeBenedictis, Justices 
Reject Bar’s Whistleblower Rule, L.A. Daily J. 3 (May 14, 2002).    
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debate of A.B. 363 and eventually passed a bill containing a 
statutory exception to the duty of confidentiality for 
government attorneys.61  However, Governor Grey Davis vetoed the 
bill, fearing that the attorney-client relationship would be 
weakened by the exception.62  Later, when Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger took office, Assemblywoman Fran Pavely introduced 
A.B. 2713, which also passed both houses with bipartisan 
support.63  On September 28, 2004, Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed 
the bill, arguing that government officials would react to the 
new policy by leaving government attorneys out of the decision-
making process.64  In 2006, Pavely again introduced another draft 
                                                
61Doskow, Two Year Journey to Nowhere, supra note 53, at 46. 
62Id. at 48 (citing Letter from Gray Davis, Governor of the State 
of Cal., to Members of the Cal. State Assembly, Veto of Assembly 
Bill 363 (Sept. 30, 2002), available at 
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/asm/ab_0351-
0400/ab_363_vt_20020930.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2008).   
63Manuel Valencia, Bill Analysis, available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_1601-
1650/ab_1612_cfa_20060118_170017_asm_floor.html (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2008).  
64Letter from Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger to the Members of the 
California State Assembly, Veto of Assembly Bill 2713, (Sept. 9, 
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of the bill, A.B. 1612.65  The Assembly voted for the measure, 
but Pavely retracted her sponsorship when it became apparent 
that the Governor would not pass the bill.66  Despite the strong 
political will to clarify the priorities of a government 
attorney, after several failed attempted reforms, the momentum 
incited by Cindy Ossias’ experience has hit an impasse.  The 
next section will evaluate the existing legal framework that 
creates these conflicting messages of transparency and secrecy.  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
2004) , available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/03-
04/bill/asm/ab_2701-2750/ab_2713_vt_20040928.html (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2008).   
65Assemb. B. 1612, 2005-06 Regular Sess. (Cal. 2006), available 
at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_1601-
1650/ab_1612_bill_20060104_amended_asm.pdf (last visited Jan. 
13, 2008). 
66Marisa Huber, Ethics Year in Review, 47 Santa Clara L. Rev. 
867, 904 (2007). The State Bar firmly opposed an exception to 
the duty of confidentiality because it felt that the duty was 
being threatened by exceptions to the duty enacted under Federal 
law and in the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct .  Id. (citing Nancy McCarthy, Bar Opposes 
Whistleblower Bill, Cal. St. B.J., (Apr. 2006). 
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III. Existing Legal Framework 
 Government attorneys in California are caught between two 
contradictory sets of laws; on one hand, the whistleblower 
statutes promote transparency in government, while on the other, 
the attorney ethics rules and statutes67 require that attorneys 
keep all client communication confidential.  The whistleblower 
statutes are not mandatory, but rather encourage government 
officials to speak out against “improper governmental 
activities”68 by immunizing them from retribution.69  In contrast, 
all lawyers must comply with the duty of confidentiality; any 
deviation from the rules or statutes that govern attorney 
behavior could subject an attorney to discipline by the State 
Bar.70  The only safe course of action for an attorney in Cindy 
                                                
67Because California attorney regulation is jointly governed by 
statute and rules of professional conduct, I will also refer to 
the entire system of regulation as “the ethics provisions.” 
68Cal. Gov’t Code. § 9149.21 (West 2007).    
69Id. § 8547.1. 
70Richard C. Wydick, Rex. R Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett,  
California Legal Ethics 44 (5th ed. 2005) [hereinafter 
California Legal Ethics]. 
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Ossias’ position is to maintain the government “client’s”71 
absolute confidentiality.72  This alternative, however, means 
that the whistleblower statutes effectively do not apply to 
government attorneys.  As a result, the Legislature’s goal of 
promoting transparency in government is consistently 
overshadowed by the duty of confidentiality.  This section will 
set forth the competing policies of government transparency and 
client confidentiality.   
A. The Whistleblower Statutes 
Whistleblowing is considered a form of internal dissent, 
whereby a member of an organization speaks out against 
wrongdoing.73  Statutes that encourage whistleblowing are 
intended to promote a government employee’s ethical duty to 
expose “waste, fraud, and abuse.”74  Whistleblowers are an 
integral part of the system of checks and balances; they sound 
                                                
71Defining the attorney’s client is a challenging task and is 
therefore the source of much debate.  See, e.g. See Wayne C. 
Witkowski, Who is the Client of the Municipal Government Lawyer, 
209 PLI/Crim 117, 155-56 (2007); COPRAC Report, supra note 7, at 
14. 
72See COPRAC Report, supra note 7, at 18.  
73Johnson, supra note 1, at 3-4.  
74Id. at 6. 
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the alarm when individuals or government entities threaten to 
overstep their authority.75  Moreover, the statutes have a 
deterrent effect on misconduct;76 faced with the possibility of 
exposure, an official would be reticent to abuse his power 
because it would be harder to hide.    
Although whistleblower-type protections trace back to the 
Civil War era,77 since the 1960’s officials have become concerned 
about public cynicism and distrust of the government.78  Modern 
whistleblower protections are one way to improve the public’s 
perception of the government.79  That many states and the Federal 
government have enacted whistleblower statutes80 reflects a 
widespread commitment to this policy.81      
                                                
75Id. at 11. 
76See id. at 75. 
77Jonathan Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical 
Analysis of Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1899, 1904 (2007) (discussing the Union government’s policy 
of paying whistleblowers who exposed fraud related to the sale 
of munitions and war supplies).  
78Johnson, supra note 1, at 16. 
79Id. at 16. 
80See, e.g. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 
101-12, 103 Stat. 32 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1211-1219, 1221, 
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There are several provisions scattered throughout the 
California Government Code that provide guidance to 
whistleblowers.  The California Whistleblower Protection Act82 
codifies the Legislature’s finding that “public servants best 
serve the citizenry when they can be candid and honest without 
reservation in conducting the people’s business.”83  An employee 
is authorized to disclose improper behavior that violates any 
law or regulation, or “is economically wasteful, or involves 
gross misconduct, incompetency, or inefficiency.”84  Upon 
receiving information about improper behavior, the State 
Auditor85 is empowered to investigate the issue and report to the 
                                                                                                                                                       
1222, 3352 (2000); A.R.S. § 38-532 (2007); C.R.S.A. § 24-50.5-
101 (2007). 
81See Macey, supra note 77, at 1901.  “But the recent positive 
publicity for whistleblowers suggests that whistleblowing is now 
viewed with less suspicion--and whistleblowers as less 
politically motivated and more altruistic--than was true in the 
past.”  Id.  
82Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 8547-8548.5 (West 2007). 
83Id. § 8547.1. 
84Id. § 8547.2(b). 
85Although the statutes do not specifically limit to whom a 
whistleblower can report, they authorize the State Auditor, 
Page 21 of 21 
appropriate oversight body.86  The whistleblower remains 
anonymous in most circumstances;87 moreover, the statutes 
expressly prohibit employees from intimidating or retaliating 
against the whistleblower.88     
The Act applies to all individuals “appointed by the 
Governor or employed or holding office in a state agency,”89 
which includes attorneys.90  Local government employees are also 
protected by whistleblower provisions.91  Depending on which 
version of the whistleblower statutes applies, private counsel 
retained by the government may not always be protected from 
being fired for speaking out against improper government 
activity.92   
                                                                                                                                                       
State Legislature, or a “local agency” to receive reports from 
government employees.  Id. §§ 53297, 8547.5, 9149.23.  
86Id. §§ 8547.5-.7. 
87Id. § 8547.5 
88Id. §§ 8547.8, 53298. 
89Id. § 8547.2(a). 
90Attorney General, supra note 53. 
91See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 53296-53299.  
92See Witkin, California Procedure, Chapter IV, Agency and 
Employment, § 258, p.337 (10th ed. 2005) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code 
§ 8547-8548.5, which is limited to protecting “state 
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The Legislature, in passing the statutes, intended to 
facilitate and encourage whistleblowing to promote integrity in 
government.93  However, the language of the statute makes it 
clear that whistleblowing is optional.94   Furthermore, employees 
are not authorized to reveal “information otherwise prohibited 
by or under law.”95    
B. A California Attorney’s Duty of Confidentiality 
The above-discussed whistleblowing statutes encourage 
government employees, including attorneys, to act ethically by 
revealing waste and wrongdoing in the government.  The competing 
                                                                                                                                                       
employees.”). Witkin is widely used by California practitioners.  
But see Cal. Gov’t Code § 9149.21 (West 2007) (“state employees 
and other persons should disclose . . . improper governmental 
activities.”(emphasis added)). 
93Attorney General, supra note 53; Cal. Gov’t Code § 9149.21 
(West 2007). 
94See Cal. Gov’t Code § 9149.21 “It is the intent of the 
Legislature that state employees . . . should disclose. . . 
improper government activities.”  Id.   
95Id. § 8547.3(d).  See also id. §§9149.21(d), 9149.23(c). 
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duty of client confidentiality96 is one of the most important 
ethical duties of a lawyer.97   
Attorney behavior in California is governed by two bodies 
of law: California Business and Professions Code sections 6000-
6238 and the California Rules of Professional Conduct 
(“Rules”).98  Members of the State Bar (“Bar”) could be subject 
to discipline for a violation of either the Code or the Rules.99 
The duty of confidentiality is codified in California 
Business and Professions Code section 6068(e)(1), which mandates 
                                                
96The duty of confidentiality is broader in scope than the 
attorney-client privilege, which an attorney can assert before a 
Court when trying to protect a communication from being 
considered in evidence.  See, e.g., In re Johnson, Cal. State 
Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, 4 Cal. 
State Bar Ct. Rptr. 179, (2000); Kevin E. Mohr, California’s 
Duty of Confidentiality: Is It Time for a Life-Threatening 
Criminal Act Exception?, 39 San Diego L. Rev. 307, 317, n.28 
(2002) (explaining that the attorney-client privilege also 
applies to discovery.). 
971 Witkin Cal. Procedure, Attorneys, § 118, p.438 (4th ed. 1997) 
[hereinafter Witkin, Attorneys]. 
98See California Legal Ethics, supra note 70, at 44.  
99Id.  
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that an attorney “maintain inviolate the confidence, and at 
every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets,100 of 
his or her client.”101  Between 1880 and 2003, the only amendment 
to the language now embodied in Section 6068(e) made the 
pronouns gender-neutral.102  In 2003, the Legislature passed the 
sole statutory exception to the duty of confidentiality.103  The 
exception allows an attorney to reveal confidential information 
where the attorney “reasonably believes the disclosure is 
necessary to prevent a criminal act that the attorney reasonably 
                                                
100The statute’s use of the words “confidence” and “secrets” has 
been criticized for failing to adequately define the 
confidential information it seeks to protect.  See, e.g. 
Proposed Cal. Rule of Prof’l Conduct 3-100 (1998)(on file with 
the California State Bar). 
101Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e)(1) (West 2007). 
102Charles Doskow, Ethics Rules in Flux: Conscience, Clarity and 
Confidentiality in California, 15 NO. 1 Prof. Law. 22, 22 (2004) 
[hereinafter Doskow, Ethics Rules in Flux].  There were also a 
few judicially-imposed exceptions.  California Legal Ethics, 
supra note 70, at 187.  
103Doskow, Ethics Rules in Flux, supra note 102, at 22-23. 
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believes is likely to result in death of, or substantial bodily 
harm to, an individual.”104   
The Rules of Professional Conduct merely supplement the 
statutory duty of confidentiality.105  Rule 3-100 prohibits a Bar 
member from revealing confidential information under Section 
6068(e)(1) unless an exception applies or the client gives 
informed consent.106  The Rule then reiterates the exception 
mentioned in Section 6068(e)(2) and provides guidance about the 
steps a Bar member should take when revealing information to 
prevent a criminal act that could result in substantial injury 
or death.107   
The duty of confidentiality is one of the central tenets in 
the attorney-client fiduciary relationship.108  It is 
“fundamental” to the existence of our legal system.109  On an 
                                                
104Cal. Bus. & Prof Code § 6068(e)(2) (West 2007).   
105In fact, there was no Rule mentioning the duty until the 
Legislature passed the statutory exception to confidentiality in 
2004. Doskow, Ethics Rules in Flux, supra note 102, at 22.  
106See Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3-100(a) (2007).    
107Id.  
108Witkin, Attorneys, supra note 97, § 118.  
109People ex rel. Department of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil 
Change Systems, Inc., 980 P.2d 371, 378 (Cal. 1999). 
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individual level, confidentiality ensures that a client is 
completely free to trust her lawyer with sensitive information, 
thereby promoting open communication.110  This allows the 
attorney to provide sound advice either in a planning or 
litigation context.  Confidentiality also enriches the entire 
legal system by encouraging potential clients to seek legal 
advice.111  Such advice is beneficial both to the client and 
arguably to the larger society.112  For attorneys, the duty of 
confidentiality is a reminder of the importance of undivided 
loyalty to one’s client.113 
                                                
110See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 
487, 500 (Cal. 1994) (“It is essential to the proper functioning 
of the lawyer's role that the client be assured that matters 
disclosed to counsel in confidence remain sacrosanct . . . .”).       
111Roger C. Cramton, Proposed Legislation Concerning a Lawyer’s 
Duty of Confidentiality, 22 Pepp. L. Rev. 1467, 1477 (1995). 
112For example, if a company is contemplating how to dispose of 
waste, consulting an attorney might not only prevent litigation 
but could also protect the public from possible health risks.   
113Anderson v. Eaton, 293 P. 788, 790 (Cal. 1930) (stating that 
confidentiality keeps “the honest practitioner from putting 
himself in a position where he may be required to choose between 
conflicting duties . . . rather than to enforce to their full 
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As discussed, the existing framework results in tension 
between the policies of government openness and client 
confidentiality.  Although the binding duty of confidentiality 
carries more weight than the statutes that merely recommend 
whistleblowing,114 there may be occasions where this dynamic 
could further empower an official to take advantage of the 
public trust by committing fraud, knowing full well that his 
attorney’s lips are sealed.   
IV. Critique of the Current System 
 Government attorneys are torn between these competing 
values of transparency and secrecy.  While the Whistleblower 
statutes encourage them to listen to their conscience, the rules 
and statutes governing attorney conduct mandate that they 
subordinate their ethical principles to promote the underlying 
                                                                                                                                                       
extent the rights of the interest which he should alone 
represent.”). 
114 In fact, the statutory duty of confidentiality overrides the 
effect of the whistleblower protections; the statutes do not 
apply to whistleblowing prohibited by law.  Cal. Gov’t Code § 
9149.21.  Therefore, since the duty of confidentiality is also 
in a statute, an attorney who discloses a client’s confidential 
information would not be immune to retaliation under the 
whistleblower protection statutes. 
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values of client confidentiality.  The first problem with this 
system is that both the Legislature and the Supreme Court have 
an interest in protecting the duty of confidentiality; however, 
in practice, because the duty is enshrined in the statute, the 
Legislature completely controls the duty.  This power imbalance 
stymies debate in the legal community about possible exceptions 
to this duty.  Second, the lack of an express exception to the 
duty of confidentiality forces the State Bar to choose between 
prosecuting an otherwise innocent attorney and ignoring the 
ethics provisions, resulting in inconsistent application of the 
ethics provisions.  Finally, the Rule of Professional Conduct 
that governs organizational clients fails to take into account 
the unique position of a government attorney.  This lack of 
guidance makes it difficult for these attorneys to identify 
their client for purposes of understanding to whom they owe the 
duty of confidentiality. 
 
 
A. Legislative Control of the Duty of Confidentiality Prevents  
 the Supreme Court from Participating in the Confidentiality 
 Discussion    
Although both the Legislature and Supreme Court 
theoretically have an interest in preserving the duty of 
confidentiality, in practice, the Legislature alone controls the 
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duty.  This section will demonstrate that housing the duty of 
confidentiality in the Business and Professions Code impedes the 
Supreme Court from exercising its inherent power over the duty 
of confidentiality.  This section will discuss the basis for 
each branch’s control over confidentiality and explain the 
dynamics of the power-sharing between the two branches.   
1. The Evolution of the California Legislature and 
Supreme Court’s Shared Power over Attorney Conduct 
The Legislature and the Supreme Court both have an interest 
in promoting good attorney conduct.  The Supreme Court must 
ensure that the legal system functions properly; this is one of 
the Court’s main duties under the California Constitution.115  In 
contrast, the Legislature seeks to protect the public at large116 
by preventing attorneys from abusing their position of power.  
Therefore, the Legislature is also empowered to regulate 
attorney conduct; it “may put reasonable restrictions upon 
constitutional functions of the Courts provided they do not 
defeat or materially impair the exercise of these functions.”117   
                                                
115See Cal. Const. art. VI, § 1; In re Attorney Discipline 
System, 967 P.2d 49, 54 (Cal. 1998). 
116In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d at 61.  
117 Brydonjack v. State Bar of California, 281 P. 1018, 1020 
(1929).  
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The California Legislature has a long history of regulating 
attorney conduct.  In 1927, the California Legislature formally 
adopted the State Bar Act (“Act”),118 which is now a part of the 
California Business & Professions Code (“Code”).119  The Act 
created an integrated bar.120  Prior to the passage of the act, 
existing voluntary bar associations had experienced difficulty 
in enforcing professional standards and assimilating the large 
waves of recently settled attorneys.121  Moreover, laypersons 
                                                
118Witkin, Attorneys supra note 97, § 358. 
119See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6000-6428 (West 2007).   This 
part of the Business and Professions Code “may be cited as the 
State Bar Act.”  Id. § 6000.   
120In an “integrated bar,” all practicing attorneys in the state 
must be members. See Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 
1, 5 (1990).  Additionally, the California Constitution now 
mandates that “[e]very person admitted and licensed to practice 
law in this State” be a member of the State Bar.”  Cal. Const. 
art. VI, § 9. 
121Corinne Lathrop Gilb, Self-Regulating Professions and The 
Public Welfare: A Case Study of the California Bar 36 (1956) 
(Ph.D. dissertation, Radcliffe College).   
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posing as lawyers had created a fiercely competitive market for 
clients.122     
The Act officially recognized the Supreme Court’s tradition 
of assuming jurisdiction over attorney discipline.123  The Act 
also established the State Bar, a “pubic corporation”124 that 
helps the Supreme Court carry out its disciplinary duties.125  
The State Bar is merely an “administrative assistant or adjunct 
of [the] Court;”126 the Court is the ultimate arbiter of 
admittance to practice law, suspension, and disbarment.127 
                                                
122Gilb, supra note 121, at 36-37.  One observer noted that out 
of 6,000 attorneys working in San Francisco, only 600 were 
actually legally authorized to do so.  Id.   
123 See In re Stevens, 241 P. 88, 92 (Cal. 1925) (holding that 
the Supreme Court has “original jurisdiction to determine 
applications for restoration to practice of attorneys and 
counselors at law after disbarment.”). 
124Cal. Const. art. VI, § 9. 
125In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d 49, 58-59 (Cal. 
1998).   
126Id. at 59. 
127See Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 11-12 
(1990).  
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Once the State Bar Act codified the California Supreme 
Court’s disciplinary power over attorneys, the California 
Supreme Court in 1928 adopted its own Rules of Professional 
Conduct.128  Today’s Rules of Professional Conduct patch together 
aspects of the American Bar Association (“ABA”) Model Rules, the 
old ABA Model Code, and earlier California legal ethics rules.129  
To amend a Rule of Professional Conduct, the State Bar Board of 
Governors adopts a draft and submits it to the Supreme Court for 
approval.130     
 In California, like in most states, the Supreme Court 
oversees the entire judicial system.131  “[T]he power to regulate 
the practice of law, including the power to admit and to 
discipline attorneys, has long been recognized to be among the 
inherent powers of the article VI [of the California 
Constitution] Courts.”132  Despite the fact that this power 
                                                
128Witkin, Attorneys, supra note 97, § 476. 
129California Legal Ethics, supra note 70. 
130See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6077 (West 2007). 
131In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d 49, 54 (Cal. 1998); 
see Cal. Const. art. VI, § 1. 
132In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d at 54.  “Admission 
to the bar is a judicial function, and members of the bar are 
officers of the Court, subject to discipline by the Court.  
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belongs to the Supreme Court, some provisions of the State Bar 
Act directly affect attorney conduct.133  One of the State Bar 
Act’s functions is regulating behavior “which would constitute 
the unauthorized practice of law if performed by a layman.”134  
The Act defines the duties of an attorney,135 among them the duty 
of confidentiality.136  Additionally, the Act includes provisions 
                                                                                                                                                       
Hence, under the constitutional doctrine of separation of 
powers, the Court has inherent and primary regulatory power 
[over admission to practice law].” (citations omitted) Witkin, 
Attorneys, supra note 97, § 356, p.438. 
133Doskow, Ethics Rules in Flux, supra note 63.   
134Baron v. City of Los Angeles, 469 P.2d 353, 358 (1970).  Given 
the widespread abuse of the “attorney at law” title, it is 
logical that the 1927 Act sought to exclude laymen from 
practice.  See Gilb, supra note 121,at 36-37.   
135Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068 (West 2007). 
136Id. § 6068(e).  As noted, infra Section III(B), the duty of 
confidentiality is a key component of an attorney’s fiduciary 
relationship to her client.  Consistent with the State Bar Act’s 
goals, confidentiality is one of the duties that sets a Bar 
member apart from other holders of Juris Doctor degrees.  Cal. 
Bus. & Prof. Code § 6067.  “Every person on his admission shall 
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that govern fee agreements and advertising, the violation of 
which could lead to discipline.137  Sections like these equate to 
direct regulation of attorney conduct.138   
The State Bar Act provoked immediate controversy; however, 
in State Bar of California v. Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County,139 the California Supreme Court upheld the Act. 140  The 
Court noted that attorneys constitute the largest and most 
influential group of professionals.141  As officers of the 
Courts, attorneys have a duty both to promote the administration 
of justice and to serve the public at large.142  However, because 
                                                                                                                                                       
take an oath . . . and faithfully to discharge the duties of any 
attorney at law . . . .”  Id.    
137Doskow, Ethics Rules in Flux, supra note 102.  
138Id.   
139278 P. 432 (Cal. 1929). 
140Id. at 439.  
141Id. at 435. 
142Id. at 435.  Arguably, an attorney’s duty to the public is 
greater than her duty to the Court. See Bradley R. Kirk, Note, 
Milking the New Sacred Cow: The Supreme Court Limits the 
Peremptory Challenge on Racial Grounds in Powers v. Ohio and 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 19 Pepp. L. Rev. 691, 722 
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being a lawyer is a prerequisite to becoming a judge, the Court 
implied that it was necessary to have another branch keep watch 
over the judiciary.143  Society  
is to be safeguarded against the ignorances or evil 
dispositions of those who may be masquerading beneath the 
cloak of the legal and supposedly learned and upright 
profession.  It is to be noted also that from the body of 
the legal profession it is required . . . the justices and 
judges of all Courts of record and of certain other 
subordinate tribunals must be chosen. 144 
In other words, fear of attorney omnipotence justified 
legislative oversight of professional conduct.145  Consistent 
with this opinion, the California Supreme Court has never held 
                                                                                                                                                       
n.267 (1992) (discussing State Bar of California v. Superior 
Court, 278 P. at 435). 
143State Bar of California v. Superior Court, 278 P. at 435.  
“From almost the inception of our state government statutory 
provision has been made for the admission, disbarment, 
suspension, or disciplining of members of the legal profession.”  
Id.  
144 See id. at 435.   
145See Hustedt v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 636 P.2d 1139, 1143 
n.7, (Cal. 1981) .   
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that the State Bar Act’s provisions that regulate attorney 
conduct are an unconstitutional exercise of legislative 
authority.146   
The California Legislature, out of a concern for the public 
welfare, is authorized under its police power to create laws 
that govern the practice of the law.147  Similarly, the 
California Supreme Court, through overseeing the Rules of 
Professional Conduct and the disciplinary system, seeks to 
protect the public.148  The Supreme Court enacts Rules of 
Professional Conduct to set standards based on the Court’s 
                                                
146Ethics Rules in Flux, supra note 133; see, e.g. Lebbos v. 
State Bar, 806 P.2d 317, 323, (Cal. 1991) (indicating that the 
State Bar Act is not “an unconstitutional delegation of judicial 
power to the State Bar” because the California Supreme Court 
retains the ability to discipline attorneys). 
147In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d 49, 61 (Cal. 1998); 
Hustedt, 636 P.2d at 1143.   
148Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1-100 (2007); see Howard v. 
Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 162 (Cal. 1993) (quoting Ames v. State 
Bar, 506 P.2d 625, 629 (Cal. 1973)).  
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perception of what constitutes appropriate legal practice.149  
When these standards are not met, members of the public can 
vindicate their rights by reporting their attorney’s misconduct 
to the State Bar.150  Therefore, the Supreme Court’s and the 
Legislature’s goals dovetail with respect to attorney 
discipline.  While the Legislature must protect the public 
welfare,151 the Court must be vigilant to ensure the reliability 
of the system it oversees.152 
                                                
149See Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1-100 (2007).  The Rules 
are designed “to protect the public and to promote respect and 
confidence in the legal profession.”  Id. 
150See, e.g., State Bar of California, The State Bar of 
California: What Does It Do?  How Does it Work?, 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/whowhat1.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2008).  
151In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d 49, 61 (Cal. 1998). 
152See In re Lavine, 41 P.2d 161, 162 (Cal. 1935).  
[T]he right to practice law not only presupposes in its 
possessor integrity, legal standing, and attainment, but 
also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal 
and partaking of the nature of a public trust, the granting 
of which privilege to an individual is everywhere conceded 
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2. The Practical Effect of This Shared Power  
Although in theory the Legislature and the Supreme Court 
both enjoy power over the duty of confidentiality, in practice, 
the Legislature’s role overshadows that of the Supreme Court 
because the duty has always been enshrined in a statute.153  An 
example of this dynamic is the story of how the Rule of 
Professional Conduct 3-100 came into existence.  Before 1987, 
there was no mention of the duty of confidentiality in the Rules 
of Professional Conduct.154  In 1987, the State Bar first 
proposed that the Supreme Court adopt Rule 3-100, which would 
borrow section 6068(e)’s concept of confidentiality and include 
five express exceptions to the duty.155  The proposed Rule 
                                                                                                                                                       
to be the exercise of a judicial function (citations 
omitted).  Id.  
153See Mohr, supra note 96, at 366.  
154See Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct Ch. 3 (1989-1992), available 
at 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar_generic.jsp?cid=101
58&id=3502.  Until 2003, when Rule 3-100 was enacted, the Rules 
did not mention the duty of confidentiality.  See Doskow, Ethics 
Rules In Flux, supra note 102. 
155Mohr, supra note 96, at 369-70.   
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defined the terms “confidence” and “secrets” to clarify the 
potentially ambiguous language in section 6068(e).156   
In deciding to decline adopting this new Rule, the Court 
did not provide its reasons.157  However, the Court, in a letter 
to the President of the State Bar, “suggested that if the rule 
was intended to permit disclosure in a proceeding where the 
attorney-client evidentiary privilege attached, the Supreme 
Court might not have the authority to approve such a rule.”158  
In other words, the Court feared intruding on the Legislature’s 
jurisdiction by creating an exception to the duty of 
confidentiality without a corresponding Evidence Code exception 
to the attorney-client privilege.159   
 In 1992, the State Bar again submitted a proposed rule to 
the Supreme Court that defined the duty of confidentiality and 
                                                
156Id. at 369 n.240. 
157Id. at 372. 
158Id. at 370 n.241.  
159Id. at 374.  Note that the attorney-client privilege is 
narrower than the duty of confidentiality, so to create an 
exception to the larger duty of confidentiality would undermine 
the Legislature’s power over the attorney-client privilege.  See 
supra, Section III(B).  
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proposed on one exception to the duty.160  The exception was 
limited to preventing criminal acts that could result in serious 
bodily injury.161  This version also included a “safe harbor,” 
whereby a lawyer who disclosed client information under the 
applicable exception would not be subject to discipline by the 
State Bar.162  The Supreme Court again rejected this suggestion 
without explanation.163   
 In 1998, the State Bar proposed another version of rule 3-
100 that included the exception for the criminal acts that might 
result in substantial bodily harm.164  This version abandoned the 
“safe harbor” provision;165 however, it suffered the same fate as 
its predecessors, receiving another curt denial.166   
 A few years later, in response to the Ossias case, the 
State Bar tried to provide guidance for future whistleblowers by 
clarifying the relationship of a government attorney to her 
                                                
160 Mohr, supra note 96 at 370-71.  
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id.  
164 Id. at 371.  
165 Id. n.246. 
166 Id. at 371-72. 
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client.167  In deciding to deny the Bar’s request, the Court 
became slightly more generous when it provided a one-sentence 
reason for rejecting the Rule, citing a conflict with the 
provisions of section 6068(e) of the Business and Professions 
Code.168 
 It was only after the Legislature passed California 
Business and Professions Code section 6068(e)(2),169 the criminal 
act exception to the duty of confidentiality, that the Supreme 
Court was willing to approve a Rule that mentioned the duty of 
confidentiality.  The current version of Rule 3-100 merely 
refers to the duty mentioned in section 6068(e)(1) and explains 
how to implement the exception in section 6068(e)(2).170   
                                                
167See infra, Section II(B). 
168In re Adoption of Amendments to Rule 3-600 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, No. S104682, (Cal. May 10, 2002) (the 
request to amend Rule 3-600 “is denied because the proposed 
modifications conflict with Business and Professions Code 
section 6068, subdivision (e).”) (on file with the California 
State Bar); see also Don J. DeBenedictis, Justices Reject Bar's 
Whistleblower Rule, L.A. Daily J. 3 (May 14, 2002). 
169Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e)(2) (West 2007). 
170Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3-100 (2007)  
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With the help of the State Bar’s input and proposals, the 
Court has had ample opportunities to clarify the scope of the 
duty and adopt appropriate exceptions.  However, the Court has 
rebuffed the legal community’s repeated attempts to refine the 
duty of confidentiality.  In the future, the Supreme Court 
should at least provide its reasons for declining to adopt 
Rules, if for no other reason than to inform the State Bar of 
which modifications might be acceptable.  
Taking together the Supreme Court’s reference to 6068(e) 
when rejecting proposed Rule 3-600171 and the fact that the Court 
changed the Rules only after the Legislature had enacted the 
statutory exception to the duty of confidentiality, it appears 
that the Supreme Court has been hesitant to even consider 
modifying the duty for fear of stepping on the Legislature’s 
toes.172  However, as noted, the duty of confidentiality is 
                                                
171In Re Adoption of Amendments to Rule 3-600 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, No. S106482 (Cal. 2002) (on file with the 
State Bar of California). 
172Id. at 379.  “These rejections probably do not reflect a deep-
seated antipathy . . . on the Court’s part to exceptions to the 
duty of confidentiality.  Rather, they more likely evince the 
Court’s belief that it does not have the authority to upend the 
absolute language” of section 6068(e), in spite of the 
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central to the existence of the legal system, and therefore 
falls within the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.  The Supreme 
Court’s deferential approach to adopting rules that deal with 
confidentiality has allowed the Legislature to “defeat or 
materially impair the exercise of [the Supreme Court’s] 
functions.”173  Therefore, keeping the duty of confidentiality in 
the Business and Professions Code would further prevent the 
Supreme Court from exercising its due power over the duty of 
confidentiality.   
B. If Immunity Is Uncertain, Few Will Dare to Speak Out 
 When there is a conflict between the mandatory duty of 
confidentiality and the optional whistleblower statutes, the 
State Bar is forced to bring disciplinary action against a 
government attorney who blows the whistle.174  However, if the 
State Bar chooses to favor transparency policies by not 
following the plain language of the ethics provisions, its 
enforcement procedure appears subjective and arbitrary.  On one 
hand, any appearance of inconsistent application of the rules 
                                                                                                                                                       
exceptions to attorney-client privilege in the Evidence Code.  
Id.    
173Brydonjack v. State Bar of California, 281 P. 1018, 1020 
(1929). 
174Attorney General, supra note 53.  
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undermines the credibility of the State Bar.  On the other, 
otherwise innocent attorneys who perform a valuable public 
service might lose their livelihoods, despite statutory language 
that encourages them to speak out.  
The way in which the State Bar Trial Counsel handled the 
Ossias case illustrates the community’s inclination to reward 
government attorney whistleblowing in spite of the clear 
statutory language to the contrary.175  After initiating an 
investigation into Ossias’ disclosures, the State Bar’s Office 
of Trial Counsel communicated to Ossias’ attorney its decision 
to discontinue the investigation.176  The Deputy Trial Counsel 
declined to analyze whether the Department of Insurance was 
Ossias’ client and whether she had breached her duty of 
confidentiality by providing documents to the legislative 
committees.177  Instead, Ossias was not disciplined because her 
conduct “(1) [] was consistent with the spirit of the 
Whistleblower Protection Act; (2) [] advanced important public 
policy considerations bearing on the responsibilities of the 
office of insurance commissioner; and (3) [was] not otherwise 
                                                
175Steedman Letter, supra note 21.   
176Id.  
177Doskow, Two-Year Journey to Nowhere), supra note 53, at 42-43  
(2003); see Steedman Letter, supra note 21. 
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subject to prosecution under the guidelines set forth in this 
office’s Statement of Disciplinary Priorities.”178   
 The Trial Counsel’s letter does not adequately explain its 
decision because there is no discussion of how Ossias’ actions 
apply to the legal framework governing attorney discipline.  
Instead of directly attacking the issues, the letter presented 
flimsy reasons for ending the investigation.  Although this 
approach was beneficial to Ossias, it cannot be used as any 
indication of how the State Bar will approach future 
whistleblowers.179   
 The first reason for exonerating Ossias--that she acted in 
the “spirit” of the act--was not at issue;180 rather, the Trial 
Counsel was tasked with deciding whether she had violated her 
duty under the provisions regulating attorney conduct.181  The 
second reason, that her behavior promoted the Department’s 
public policy considerations, essentially means that her 
“conduct assisted her client, the Department of Insurance, in 
                                                
178Steedman Letter, supra note 21. 
179Zitrin and Langford, supra note 14, at 552. 
180 Indeed, the whistleblower laws make no mention of immunity 
from State Bar disciplinary action.  See, e.g. Cal. Gov’t Code 
§§ 8547-8548.5 (West 2007). 
181Doskow, Two Year Journey to Nowhere, supra note 53, at 41.  
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doing its job.”182  Public policy is not an excuse for violating 
an attorney’s ethical obligations.183  The third and final 
reason, that the behavior was “not otherwise subject to 
prosecution,”184 was actually an exercise in prosecutorial 
discretion.185  In reality, the Bar was attempting to appease the 
majority of the bar members, public and Legislature, all of whom 
firmly supported Ossias’ actions.186 
 Since Ossias was a likeable whistleblower, her actions were 
widely publicized, and Quackenbush’s behavior was so egregious, 
the Trial Counsel had little choice but to bow the pressures of 
public opinion and discontinue the investigation.187  Perhaps in 
failing to discuss whether Ossias had complied with the 
statutes, the Office of Trial Counsel recognized that it was not 
in a position to fashion its own exception to the duty of 
confidentiality.  The letter is of little use to future 
attorneys in Ossias’ position.188  Furthermore, the Bar 
                                                
182Id.  
183See id.  
184Steedman Letter, supra note 21. 
185Journey to Nowhere, supra note 131, at 41. 
186Id. at 40-41. 
187Id. 
188Zitrin and Langford, supra note 13, at 552.   
Page 47 of 47 
explicitly stated that the letter contained no public policy 
implications.189  
 At the very least, in Ossias’ case, the State Bar was 
reluctant to allow the stringent duty of confidentiality to 
override the whistleblower policies, meaning that the duty of 
confidentiality may not be as absolute as it seems.  In other 
words, depending on the egregiousness and public policy 
implications of the act that the whistleblower reveals, the 
disciplinary arm of the State Bar might be willing to look the 
other way.190  The consequence of this ad-hoc approach creates 
uncertainty for government attorneys; they are unable to 
realistically assess the risks and benefits of disclosure 
because they do not know whether they will be disciplined, and 
if so, to what extent.191  If an attorney is not sure whether it 
is safe to speak out, she will choose to be silent.  There is a 
public cost to silence: a watered-down approach to government 
transparency.   
 Some might argue that the duty of confidentiality should 
always be favored over transparency policies, even in the case 
of government attorneys.  After all, it is a duty that sets Bar 
                                                
189Steedman Letter, supra note 26. 
190See Doskow, Ethics Rules in Flux, supra note --, at 23. 
191Id.  
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members apart from other non-accredited attorneys.192  Although 
this is true, government attorneys are in a unique position.  
They, like their fellow civil servants, are repositories of the 
public trust and are paid out of tax money to serve the public.  
To allow civil servants to use a government attorney’s services 
to commit a fraud on the public does little to enrich society.  
Public officials cannot expect the same level of confidentiality 
as a private client.193      
 In sum, the combination of ethics provisions and 
whistleblower statutes does little to support the important 
public policy of transparency.  However, where the conditions 
are right, there may be future cases that warrant breaching the 
duty of confidentiality.  Creating a narrowly tailored standard 
to guide future government attorney whistleblowers will not 
erode all confidentiality.  The provisions of a possible 
exception to the duty of confidentiality for government 
attorneys are beyond the scope of this article; however, in the 
interim, a change in the structure of the duty of 
confidentiality could make the system more amenable to adopting 
important policies.194 
                                                
192See supra, Section III(B). 
193See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
194See infra, Section V(A)(1). 
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C. “Government as Client” Is Not the Same As “Organization as 
Client”195 
The tension between the competing obligations of 
whistleblowing and confidentiality is exacerbated by the fact 
that the government attorney is representing an organizational 
client with a non-traditional power structure.  Rule 3-600 
defines the “client” of an attorney that represents an 
organization; however, the type of client the Rule contemplates 
does not include the government.  There are two main ways in 
which the Rule fails to take into account the unique situation 
of government attorneys.  First, and most importantly, it is not 
clear to whom a public attorney owes the duty of 
confidentiality.196  Second, the Rule’s reporting scheme for non-
governmental organizations does not take into account the 
concerns of a governmental agency.197 
 1. The Structure and Content of Rule 3-600  
                                                
195Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3-600 (2007).  “Organization 
as Client” is the heading of this Rule.  Id. 
196 COPRAC Report, supra note 7 at 14. 
197 See Richard C. Solomon, Wearing Many Hats: Confidentiality 
and Conflicts of Interest Issues for the California Public 
Lawyer, 25 Sw. U. L. Rev 265, 295-96 (1996). 
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Rule 3-600 defines an organizational client as the entity 
itself, acting through the highest authorized agent.198  Where an 
employee acts in a manner that could injure the organization, 
the attorney is prohibited from breaching her duty of 
confidentiality under California Business and Professions Code 
Section 6068(e).199  In this situation, the attorney has the 
option to 1. urge reconsideration;200 2. report the deviant 
behavior to a higher internal authority, or if necessary, to the 
highest person who is authorized to represent the 
organization;201 or 3. discontinue representation in accordance 
with the mandatory resignation procedures listed in 3-700.202 
Furthermore, where the officers, directors, shareholders or 
employees’ interests conflict with the organization’s interests, 
the attorney is expected to explain that she is representing the 
entire organization, not them as individuals.203  The lawyer 
“should not be influenced by the personal desires of any person 
                                                
198Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3-600(A) (2007). 
199Id. R. 3-600(B). 
200 Id. R. 3-600(B)(1). 
201Id. R. 3-600(B)(2). 
202Id. R. 3-600(C). 
203See R. 3-600(D); Cal. State Bar Comm. Prof’l Responsibility, 
Op. 1989-113 (1989).  
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or organization”204 because the only client is the “corporate 
entity actually represented.”205 
2. The Rule’s Definition of “Client” Does Not Apply to 
Government Entities.    
The central problem with this Rule is that the concept of 
“client” does not apply to government attorneys.206  If the 
government client were the “entity itself, acting through the 
highest authorized agent,”207 then the public servants in a 
government organization would be working for a head official 
with absolute power.  However, unlike in a corporation,208 the 
head official of a government agency does not have complete 
                                                
204Cal. State Bar Comm. Prof’l Responsibility, Op. 1989-113 
(1989) (citing Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility, EC 5-18).   
205Id. 
206See COPRAC Report, supra note 7, at 4. 
207Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3-600 (2007). 
208Id.    “In representing an organization, a member shall 
conform his or her representation to the concept that the client 
is the organization itself, acting through its highest 
authorized officer, employee, body, or constituent overseeing 
the particular engagement.”  Id. 
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managerial power over the agency.  The “client”209 of a 
traditional corporation allocates resources, passes bylaws, and 
authorizes transactions.   
In contrast, in the case of a government entity, the 
Legislature may allocate funding and regulate the organizational 
structure while the executive branch appoints an agency 
director.210  This multi-layered approach to administrating a 
governmental organization makes it unclear who has the ultimate 
responsibility for the organization.211  Without that 
information, the attorney has no notice about to whom she owes 
the duty of confidentiality.     
3. The Rule’s Contemplated Reporting Scheme Does Not  
Apply to Government Organizations. 
                                                
209 The “highest authorized officer, employee, body, or 
constituent overseeing the particular engagement.”  Id. 
210See generally Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code (West 2007).  
211Attorney General, supra note 53, at 2.  (speculating about who 
is the “client” of an attorney representing the Medical Board of 
California: “the board itself, its executive director, the 
Department of Consumer Affairs of which the board is a part, the 
State and Consumer Services Agency in which the department is 
situated, or possibly someone else such as the Governor?”).  
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Rule 3-600 describes the steps an attorney can take to 
report wrongdoing within the organization to the “highest 
internal authority that can act on behalf of the 
organization.”212  However, this scheme does not make sense in 
the government context.  First, the organizational harm 
described in the rule does not reflect the concerns of a 
governmental organization.  Second, the lack of a definition of 
the “client” means that the attorney does not know to whom she 
is authorized to report this harm.   
The type of harm a governmental organization may suffer is 
different from Rule’s designated harms.213  For this reason, a 
government attorney might not be able to determine which types 
of activities merit reporting.  The Rule recognizes two types of 
harm: “a violation of law reasonably imputable to the 
organization” and behavior “which is likely to cause substantial 
injury to the organization.”214  Since government organizations 
are not motivated to earn a profit, the types of “injury” a 
government organization could suffer are inherently different 
from those of a regular corporation.  While corporations risk 
                                                
212 Rule 3-600(B)(2). 
213See Solomon, supra note 197, at 295; see also COPRAC Report at 
15. 
214Cal. Rule of Prof’l Conduct R. 3-600(B)(2007).  
Page 54 of 54 
lost profits, civil liability, or bankruptcy if an agent acts 
maliciously, a government organization will not be shut down 
because of a few bad eggs.215  The government entity may risk 
public distrust; however, its existence will not be threatened 
in the same way as a corporation.216  In turn, because this 
concept of “harm” to a government organization is so ambiguous, 
it is also subjective and difficult to identify.  Therefore, the 
current language of Rule 3-600 that authorizes an attorney to 
report on “harmful” activities does not provide sufficient 
guidance to government attorneys. 
Moreover, if a government attorney feels compelled to 
report wrongdoing, Rule 3-600’s reporting scheme would be 
ineffective.  Determining who is the “highest internal 
authority”217 to whom the attorney may report is difficult in the 
government context because “highest” and “internal” are open to 
interpretation unless they are specifically defined in the 
Rules.  For example, Cindy Ossias believed that the public was 
her client, in particular because the mission of the CDI is to 
                                                
215See Solomon, supra note 197, at 296. 
216Id. at 297. 
217Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3-600(B)(2) (2007). 
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protect consumers.218  Depending on how one chooses to identify 
the government client, the “highest internal authority” could be 
the director of the agency, the legislative sub-committee that 
oversees the agency, the speaker of the Assembly, or the 
Governor.219  Since government attorneys currently have no 
guidance on the identity of their “client,” they do not know to 
whom they owe the duty of confidentiality, and therefore, must 
guess to how they can safely report organizational wrongdoing. 
V. Proposal 
As illustrated above, the current legal framework makes it 
difficult for government attorneys to reconcile these competing 
policies.  This article proposes two solutions to the challenges 
discussed above.  First, the Bar should propose that the duty of 
confidentiality be moved from the California Business and 
Professions Code to the Rules of Professional Conduct.  Second, 
the State Bar should identify the client of an attorney 
representing a governmental organization and incorporate this 
                                                
218 E-mail from Cindy Ossias, Senior Staff Counsel, California 
Department of Insurance, to Jessica Shpall, Loyola Law School 
(Jan. 14, 2008, 10:54:00 PST) (on file with author).   
219See Witkowski, supra note 71.  
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new definition into a separate Rule of Professional Conduct.220  
These solutions are independent of one another; both should be 
adopted, but if that is not possible, implementing either 
alternative could significantly improve the current situation.  
This section will explain how the proposals address the problems 
with the current legal framework, consider limitations to the 
proposals, and explore how to overcome these limitations.   
A. Transfer the Duty of Confidentiality to the Rules of  
Professional Conduct 
1. Proposal 
The duty of confidentiality should be moved from the 
California Business and Professions Code to the Rules of 
Professional Conduct because doing so would strike the 
appropriate constitutional balance between the Supreme Court’s 
concern for the legal system and the Legislature’s desire to 
protect the public.  As noted, the Supreme Court has rebuffed 
all efforts by the Bar to modify the duty of confidentiality, 
apparently because the Court believes that it is powerless to do 
so as long as the duty is codified. 221  This does a disservice to 
                                                
220Another option is to change the language of Rule 3-600 to 
reflect the needs of government attorneys; however, adopting a 
new Rule would be more user-friendly.   
221See supra, Section IV(A)(2). 
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the legal system because the State Bar and the Supreme Court are 
in the best position to shape the duty of confidentiality.   
First, the Supreme Court has inherent power to regulate 
attorneys.222  As noted above, the Legislature is allowed to 
share this power subject to certain limits.223  In the past, when 
the Supreme Court has perceived that the Legislature is 
preventing it from exercising this power over the legal system, 
the Supreme Court has re-asserted its right to act 
unilaterally.224  For example, although the State Bar functions 
                                                
222 See, e.g. In Re Discipline System, 967 P.2d 49, 55 (Cal. 
1998). 
223See Id. at 55-56.  
224See, e.g., Id. at 49. (upholding the Court’s power to set bar 
dues after the Legislature had failed to do so); Hustedt v. 
Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 636 P.2d 1139 (1981)( 
holding that the Legislature, in authorizing the Workers’ 
Compensation Appeals Board to discipline an attorney, had 
undermined the Court’s jurisdiction over disciplinary 
proceedings); Merco Construction Engineers, Inc. v. Municipal 
Court, 581 P.2d 636 (1978) (holding that the Legislature, by 
allowing a corporate officer who was not an attorney to appear 
in a civil action, usurped the Court’s power to authorize 
admission to practice law).    
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as an arm of the Supreme Court, the Legislature typically 
designates how much the Bar can collect in dues.225  In 1998, 
however, then-governor Wilson vetoed a bill enabling the State 
Bar to collect yearly dues of $458.00 and the Bar’s disciplinary 
system became severely backlogged due to lack of funding.226  
Since the disciplinary system is the Court’s mechanism for 
ensuring good attorney conduct and keeping the legal system 
running, the Court held that it was necessary to impose the 
fees.227   
Likewise, the Court’s reticence to change the Rules of 
Professional Conduct for fear of affecting the statutory duty of 
confidentiality228 has allowed the Legislature to “defeat or 
materially impair the exercise of these functions.”229  The duty 
of confidentiality primarily exists230 to enable the legal system 
                                                
225In Re Discipline System, 967 P.2d at 52.  
226Id. at 54. 
227Id. at 52.  
228Supra, section IV(A)(2).   
229Brydonjack v. State Bar of California, 281 P. 1018, 1020 
(1929).  
230Although the duty also seeks to protect the public from harm, 
the main purpose is to enable clients to rely on their 
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to function,231 and therefore is an essential aspect of the 
Court’s power to regulate attorney conduct.232  Therefore, the 
Court should follow its reasoning from In Re Discipline System233 
by reasserting its due power over the duty of confidentiality. 
Second, the State Bar and its respective committees are in 
the best position to study the dynamics of the duty of 
confidentiality.  Because the Bar234 spends the bulk of its time 
and energy adjudicating issues that evaluate whether a 
particular attorney’s behavior complies with the disciplinary 
rules,235 it is familiar with the pitfalls of the current ethics 
provisions and therefore is in a position to suggest potential 
revisions.  Furthermore, the Bar has subcommittees staffed with 
ethics experts who are tasked with researching the Rules of 
                                                                                                                                                       
attorneys, thereby ensuring that clients make use of the legal 
system. See supra, Section III(B).  
231See supra, Section IV(2).  
232 People ex rel. Department of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil 
Change Systems, Inc., 980 P.2d 371, 378 (Cal. 1999). 
233967 P.2d 49, 55 (Cal. 1998) 
234And, to a lesser degree, the Court. 
235In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d 49, 58-59 (Cal. 
1998)(noting that the State Bar assists the Court in 
disciplining attorneys).  
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Professional Conduct.236  For example, the principal purpose of 
the Bar’s Commission for the Revision of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct is to strengthen the Rules of Professional 
Conduct by staying abreast of developments in the field of 
professional responsibility.237  By placing the duty of 
confidentiality within the Rules, the Commission’s contributions 
would not fall on deaf ears, as they sometimes have in the past, 
but might have a better chance of being implemented.  This would 
mean that any changes to the duty of confidentiality would be 
grounded in a careful study of the current trends in legal 
ethics.    
Third, housing the duty of confidentiality in the Rules of 
Professional Conduct would provide greater flexibility for 
                                                
236Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Discipline, 
http://calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar_generic.jsp?cid=10130&i
d=1104 (last visited Jan. 13, 2008). 
237See Charter of the Comm. for the Revision of the Rules of 
Prof’l Conduct, available at 
http://calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar_generic.jsp?cid=10129 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2007).   Among the Committees goals are 
“eliminating ambiguities” and “fostering the evolution of a 
national standard with respect to professional responsibility 
issues.”  Id.  
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modification without eroding the duty.  This is because the 
Court is less swayed by political currents and can act 
independently of other branches238 while still remaining 
accountable to the public.  Because the legislative process 
requires continuous negotiation between political parties, the 
Legislature is “probably more susceptible than the Court to the 
pressures of various interested parties, and the compromises 
that would likely ensue might weaken the proposed 
legislation.”239  Although such negotiations might be appropriate 
for other issues such as education and transportation, the duty 
of confidentiality is vital to the attorney-client relationship 
and the broader legal system.240  The Supreme Court, therefore, 
is best positioned to oversee the duty because it would be able 
to independently evaluate the merits of a proposed change.          
Although the Court does not face the same political 
pressure as the Legislature, there are important checks on its 
power to regulate attorney conduct.  First, unlike Federal 
judges, California Supreme Court Justices do not enjoy life 
tenure; rather, they are re-elected every twelve years.241  
                                                
238Mohr, supra note 96, at 383. 
239Id. at 383.    
240Id.  
241Cal. Const. art. VI, § 16; Mohr, supra note 96, at 383.   
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Although twelve years may be a long time for a constituent to 
remember a Justice’s controversial decision, the Justices are 
still subject to some degree of accountability.  Moreover, the 
Court and the State Bar are both “sensitive to the concerns of 
their constituents”242 and therefore are unlikely to make any 
drastic changes to the duty of confidentiality.  The policy of 
collecting public comments on proposed rules seeks to 
incorporate the views of the public at large and the many 
stakeholders within the Bar.243  As a result of public comments, 
the State Bar has even revised and withdrawn proposed rules.244  
This respect for the legal community’s input, as well as the 
fact that the Justices have to earn their re-election, will keep 
the Court from unduly modifying the duty of confidentiality.   
Finally, moving the duty to the Rules of Professional 
Conduct would not undermine the long history of strict 
confidentiality in California.245  The Court has a strong record 
of protecting the attorney-client relationship.246  Moreover, the 
                                                
242 Mohr, supra note 96 at 383. 
243Id. 
244Id.  
245Id. 
246Id. (citing Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 
487, 503 (cal. 1994); see also People ex rel. Department of 
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State Bar is unlikely to bow to peer pressure when considering 
exceptions to the duty of confidentiality.  For example, the 
State Bar opposed Assemblywoman Pavely’s 2006 bill because it 
feared that the duty of confidentiality was being threatened.247  
The Court and State Bar’s combined commitment to confidentiality 
is grounded in a desire and responsibility to ensure the 
integrity of the legal system;248 moving the duty of 
confidentiality to the Rules would therefore not decrease its 
effectiveness because the Court understands that it is essential 
that clients trust their attorneys with sensitive information.249  
                                                                                                                                                       
Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc., 980 P.2d 371, 
378 (Cal. 1999). 
247Huber, supra note 66.  Additionally, the California Bar has 
aggressively opposed the Sarbanes-Oxley rules that create new 
exceptions to the duty of confidentiality.  Thomas G. Bost, 
Corporate Lawyers After the Big Quake: The Conceptual Fault Line 
in the Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 19 Geo. J. Legal 
Ethics 1089, 1126-1136 (2006).   
248See supra, Section IV(A)(1). 
249People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change 
Systems, Inc., 980 P.2d 371, 378, (Cal. 1999).  “The paramount 
concern must be to preserve public trust in the scrupulous 
administration of justice and the integrity of the bar.”  Id. 
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2. Addressing the Limitations of this Proposal 
A limitation to this proposal is that the Legislature has 
presided over the duty of confidentiality for more than 130 
years.250  This proposal would require all three branches of 
government to agree that this long-held tradition is worth 
changing.251  Although the statutory duty is deeply entrenched in 
California’s legal history, transferring the duty to the Rules 
of Professional Conduct would strengthen the attorney-client 
relationship by allowing the Legislature and the Supreme Court 
to share power over communications issues.   
First, the Legislature would retain some degree of control 
over confidentiality.252  The attorney-client privilege, an 
important subset of client confidentiality, would remain under 
the Legislature’s control.253  The Supreme Court has consistently 
upheld the Legislature’s role in this respect.254   
Second, the Legislature’s goal in regulating the duty of 
confidentiality is to protect the public under its police 
                                                
250Mohr, supra note 96, at 385.  
251Id. 
252Id.  
253Id. (citing Cal. Evid. Code § 911 (2000)).  
254Id. (citing General Dynamics v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 
504 (1994)).  
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power.255  However, since the Supreme Court shares this desire to 
protect the public, transferring the duty to the Rules would not 
minimize this concern.  Rather, making this proposed change 
would ensure that the Supreme Court’s interests are also being 
addressed. 
Finally, this idea is neither radical nor novel.  The state 
bars and supreme courts of every state other than California 
oversee the duty of confidentiality.256  In joining the rest of 
the country, California would not be relinquishing or watering 
down its unique views on confidentiality;257 rather, the Bar 
would be able to freely debate the issue without having to worry 
about persuading the Legislature of its views.258  Moreover, it 
is possible that the State Bar would support this transfer.  In 
the wake of the Ossias case, COPRAC considered transferring the 
section 6068(e) duty of confidentiality to a new rule but 
abandoned the idea due to time constraints and other 
                                                
255Supra, Section IV(A)(1). 
256Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda, 2004 Selected Standards 
on Professional Responsibility, Appendix A, 144-155 (2004).  
257Bost, supra note 247.  
258See Huber, supra note 66 (discussing the Bar’s efforts to 
lobby the Assembly).   
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priorities.259  Now that the Court has denied COPRAC’s request to 
change rule 3-600 and history has shown the political challenges 
of modifying the statutory duty,260 the State Bar should propose 
that the duty of confidentiality be transferred to the Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  
B. Create a New Rule of Professional Conduct that Identifies 
Whom the Government Attorney Is Representing and When to 
Report Wrongdoing to This “Client” 
 1. Proposal  
This proposal calls on the California State Bar to 
promulgate a new Rule of Professional Conduct that addresses the 
attorney-client relationship in the government context.  As 
noted, the language of Rule 3-600 does not apply to the unique 
situation of government attorneys.261  Most importantly, the 
State Bar should identify the government attorney’s client and 
delineate an appropriate reporting scheme for informing that 
“client” of wrongdoing in the organization.  Because changes to 
the language of Rule 3-600 would be comprehensive, the State Bar 
                                                
259COPRAC Report, supra note 7, at 20-21.  In the wake of the 
Quackenbush scandal, COPRAC considered transferring the duty of 
confidentiality from section 6068(e) to a new rule 3-100.  Id.  
260Supra, Section IV(A)(2). 
261See supra, Section IV(C)(2). 
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should adopt a new Rule that specifically addresses attorney-
client issues in the government.  This proposal should be 
implemented regardless of whether the duty of confidentiality is 
transferred to the Rules of Professional Conduct.262     
a. Identify Whom a Government Attorney Represents 
Rule 3-600 identifies the nature of the relationship  
between an attorney and her client.263  Where a client is an 
organization, the Rule identifies to whom the attorney owes 
allegiance.264  The State Bar and Supreme Court are the only 
entities who should have the power to define the attorney-client 
relationship.  The Court has the inherent power to regulate 
attorney conduct.265  The Bar has expertise in understanding the 
issues that affect attorneys and clients in conflict.266  The 
fact that there is no equivalent statute in the Business and 
Professions Code reflects the Court and Bar’s traditional roles 
as the appropriate entities to define this relationship. 
                                                
262See id. at 21. “We never viewed a new rule 3-100 as necessary 
to adopt our recommended changes to rule 3-600.”  Id. 
263See Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3-600 (2007). 
264See id. R. 3-600(D).  
265See, e.g. In Re Discipline System, 967 P.2d 49, 55 (Cal. 
1998). 
266Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6013.5.  
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This proposal differs significantly from COPRAC’s 
unsuccessful attempt to modify Rule 3-600, in 2002.267  First, 
COPRAC’s proposed Rule, although it purported to clarify “who 
is” the government attorney’s client, did not specifically 
identify the governmental client because COPRAC recognized that 
an attorney’s client may vary from case to case.268  In other 
words, COPRAC noted the complexity of deciding who the client is 
but declined to answer the question.     
Second, COPRAC’s suggestion in reality seemed to override 
the statutory duty of confidentiality, or at least, call it into 
question by creating a proposed safe-harbor provision.269  The 
Proposed Rule contemplated a system for reporting within the 
agency.270  If such a reporting scheme failed and certain 
conditions were met, a government attorney  
                                                
267See supra, Section II(B). 
268COPRAC Report, Exh. 1 (Proposed Rule 3-600, Discussion, at 4).  
“On the other hand, when a member represents a state agency, the 
client generally will be the agency itself, but under certain 
circumstances, it may also be a branch of government, such as 
the executive branch, or the government as a whole.”  Id. 
269Id.  
270Id. 
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would act consistently with his or her duty of protecting 
any confidential information as provided in Business and 
Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) by referring 
the matter to the law enforcement agency charged with 
responsibility over the matter or to any other governmental 
agency or official charged with overseeing or regulating 
the matter.271 
In other words, COPRAC tried provide a safe harbor to protect 
government attorney whistleblowers from Bar prosecution.  
Because COPRAC did not specify exactly whom a government 
attorney represents, reporting to a “law enforcement agency” or 
other agency with oversight” could arguably break one’s duty of 
confidentiality.  Had COPRAC defined “client” as broadly as “the 
government” or “the executive branch,” reporting to another 
agency or law enforcement would not violate the duty.  COPRAC 
itself recognized that the proposed rule might not be capable of 
immunizing an attorney from violating the statutory duty of 
confidentiality; “[a]lthough the Supreme Court can provide a 
safe harbor from discipline for violation of the rules it has 
adopted, there is a question whether it can provide a safe 
harbor for a lawyer who violates a provision of the State Bar 
                                                
271Id. 
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Act.”272  Consequently, the Supreme Court perceived that the 
proposed rule unduly intervened with the Legislature’s 
jurisdiction and denied the request.273    
In contrast, the present proposal is limited to requesting 
that the State Bar propose a rule that truly identifies the 
government “client,” and the proper means of reporting 
wrongdoing within the client entity.  Instead of trying to 
provide a safe harbor, which could again be perceived as 
interfering with the statute, the Bar should focus on defining 
the attorney-client relationship to alert attorneys of the 
limits of their representation of the government client. 
To determine whom a government attorney represents, the 
State Bar will need to evaluate the existing theories and 
determine which best applies.  Designating which model the State 
Bar should choose is beyond the scope of this article; however, 
numerous scholars have contributed to the debate on the identity 
of a government client.274  Given that there are so many 
                                                
272COPRAC Report, supra note 7, at 18. 
273In Re Adoption of Amendments to Rule 3-600 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, No. S106482 (Cal. 2002) (on file with the 
State Bar of California). 
274 See, e.g. Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer as Whistleblower: 
Confidentiality and the Government Lawyer, 5 Geo. J. Legal 
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permutations of the government attorney-client relationship 
within the structure of the government,275 the Bar may have to 
adopt a complex Rule with instructions for how to approach a 
less-traditional representation model.  
b. Create a Separate Rule of Professional Conduct  
That Incorporates This New Description of the  
Attorney-Government Client Relationship.  
                                                                                                                                                       
Ethics 291, 296 (1991); Robert P. Lawry, Confidences and the 
Government Lawyer, 57 N.C. L. Rev. 625 (1979); Solomon, supra 
note 197, at 298-312; Witkowski, supra note 71, at 154-68.    
275 See Witkowski, supra note 71, at 124-26.  Witkowski 
identifies three examples where the question of “who is the 
client” arises.  First, where an Assistant Attorney General is 
tasked with litigating an issue for another government agency, 
yet believes the case should be settled.  Second, where several 
agencies within the same branch of government participate in 
negotiations and the attorneys are working together despite 
potentially adverse interests.  Third, where a city attorney is 
assigned to represent the mayor charged with corruption and 
feels that there is a conflict of interest because she is 
“obligated to represent the interests of the government and the 
public.”  Id. 
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The State Bar should create a new Rule that would 
specifically address the nuances of the attorney-client 
relationship in the government context.276  First, because the 
current rule fails to consider not only whom a government 
attorney represents but also how to report wrongdoing to that 
“client,”277 adopting a new Rule would be more less confusing 
than separating each sub-section of Rule 3-600 into 
“governmental organization” and “non-governmental organization.”  
Moreover, if the State Bar decides to designate several models 
for different government attorneys to identify their the client, 
it might be simpler to just have a separate Rule.  However, 
although this is the preferred method, if the Bar chooses not to 
adopt a new Rule, it should at least change the language of Rule 
3-600 as discussed above.  
2. Addressing the Limitations of This Proposal 
As noted above, identifying who exactly is the government 
client will be a challenging task for the State Bar.  However, 
leaving this inquiry unanswered would keep government attorneys 
unsure of the nature of their relationship with their “client.”  
Without clear guidance, an attorney who witnesses wrongdoing 
                                                
276 This new Rule could be entitled “Governmental Organization as 
Client.” 
277See supra, Section IV(C).  
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would be placed in the uncomfortable position of trying to 
figure out to whom she owes the duty of confidentiality.278  The 
State Bar, with its many resources, should be able to answer 
this question.  Finding the right approach to the issue of the 
identity of a government client may even require several 
attempts and extensive input from the community; however, this 
is an essential task.  A government attorney who does not know 
the identity of her client could be exposed to scrutiny from the 
State Bar if she chooses to report wrongdoing.  Worse yet, she 
might decide not to report it at all, to the detriment of the 
citizens of California.     
VI. Conclusion 
 Government attorneys in California are forced to choose 
between their position as public servants and counselors of law.  
Moving the duty of confidentiality to the Rules of Professional 
Conduct would enable the Supreme Court to better manage this 
important duty, and this in turn would ensure that the changing 
needs of the legal system are being met.  The Supreme Court 
could then consider the merits of creating an exception to duty 
for government attorneys.  Regardless of whether this occurs, 
the State Bar should adopt a new Rule of Professional Conduct 
and, within it, define who, exactly, is the client of a 
                                                
278 Doskow, Ethics Rules in Flux, supra note 102..  
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government attorney.  Adopting one or both of these proposals 
would provide clarity to attorneys who are currently forced to 
choose between the legal system’s requirements and their own 
ethical concerns.   
